The Problem Of Punishment

The main purpose of the previous chapter on moral responsibility theory was to lay the groundwork for a viable conception of responsibility that could be used in a reasonably just legal system in order to make accurate determinations of blameworthiness and accountability for punishment. It seems plausible to argue that whatever the most viable theory of responsibility turns out to be, any plausible theory of punishment must accommodate it. For example, if it turns out that determinism is true, then no one would be responsible in the relevant sense and punishable for their deeds, however harmful. So an abolitionist theory of punishment would be able to accommodate that supposed fact regarding responsibility. On the other hand, let us suppose that some version of compatibilism is the most philosophically plausible theory of the metaphysics of freedom and determinism underlying our notion of responsibility. In this case, a plausible theory of punishment would be some version of non-abolitionism that understands hard treatment of this or that form to be justified in at least some cases. Thus it cannot be overemphasized how important responsibility theory is for punishment theory (and vice versa).