Abstract
Notions related to explanation have also emerged in theories of belief change in AI. One does not just want to incorporate new beliefs, but often also, to justify them. The main motivation of these theories is to develop logical and computational mechanisms to incorporate newinformation to a scientific theory, data base or set of beliefs. Different types of change are appropriate in different situations. Indeed, the pioneeringwork of Carlos Alchourrón, PeterGärdenfors and David Makinson (often referred as theAGMapproach) [AGM85], proposes a normative theory of epistemic change characterized by the conditions that a rational belief change operator should satisfy.
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© 2006 Springer
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ALISEDA, A. (2006). EPISTEMIC CHANGE. In: ABDUCTIVE REASONING. Synthese Library, vol 330. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3907-7_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3907-7_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3906-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-3907-2
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