Skip to main content

A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake

  • Chapter
Recent Work on Intrinsic Value

Part of the book series: Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy ((LOET,volume 17))

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Anderson E., 1993. Value in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baron Marcia W., 1997. “Kantian Ethics”, in Three Methods of Ethics, Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beardsley, Monroe C., 1965. “Intrinsic Value”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 26: 1–17 [* pp. 61–75 of this volume].

    Google Scholar 

  • Bradley, Ben, 1998. “Extrinsic Value”. Philosophical Studies, 91: 109–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brentano F., 1969 (1889). The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong. London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Broome, John, 1999. “Normative Requirements”. Ratio, 12: 398–419.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bykvist, Krister, 1998. Changing Preferences: A Study in Preferentialism. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brülde, Bengt, 1998. The Human Good. Göteborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisholm, Roderick M., 1968–9. “The Defeat of Good and Evil”. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 42: 21–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlson, Erik, 1995. Consequentialism Reconsidered. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlson, Erik, 1997. “The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs”. Philosophical Studies, 85: 95–107 [* pp. 361–70 of this volume].

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, Jonathan, 1993. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dancy, Jonathan, 1999. “On the Logical and Moral Adequacy of Particularism”, Theoria, 65: 212–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, Fred, 1997. “On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures”. Ethics, 107: 448–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hansson, Sven Ove, 1998. Structures of Value — An Investigation of the Statics and Dynamics of Values and Norms. Lund Philosophy Reports, Department of Philosophy, Lund University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harman, Gilbert H., 1967. “Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value”. Journal of Philosophy, 64: 792–805 [* pp. 349–60 of this volume].

    Google Scholar 

  • Humberstone, I. L., 1996. “Intrinsic/Extrinsic”. Synthese, 108: 205–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kagan, S., 1992. “The Limits of Well-being”, in The Good Life and the Human Good, eds. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kagan, S., 1998. “Rethinking Intrinsic Value”. Journal of Ethics, 2: 277–97 [* pp. 97–114 of this volume].

    Google Scholar 

  • Kant, I., 1913 (1790). Kritik der Urteilskraft. Akademieausgabe, Berlin: Verlag Georg Reimer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, Christine M., 1996a. “Two Distinctions in Goodness”, in Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 249–74; reprinted from Philosophical Review, 92 (1983): 169–95 [* pp. 77–96 of this volume].

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, Christine M., 1996b. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, Christine M., 1997. “The Normativity of Instrumental Reason”, in Garrett Cullity and Berys Kraut (eds), Ethics and Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 215–54.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, Christine M., 1998. “Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self: A Reply to Ginsborg, Guyer and Schneewind”. Ethics, 109: 49–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lemos, Noah M., 1994. Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, David, 1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–43.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. E., 1903. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (revised edition, 1993).

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. E., 1922. Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. E., 1965 (1912). Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moore, G. E., 1993. “Preface to the second edition”, in Principia Ethica, revised edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oldfield, Edward, 1977. “An Approach to a Theory of Intrinsic Value”. Philosophical Studies, 32: 233–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O’Neill, John, 1992. “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value”. The Monist, 75:2: 119–137.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pettit, Philip and Smith, Michael. 1990. “Backgrounding Desire”. Philosophical Review, 99: 565–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quinn, Warren, 1974. “Theories of Intrinsic Value”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 11: 123–132.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quinn, Philip, 1977. “Improved Foundations for a Logic of Intrinsic Value”. Philosophical Studies, 32: 73–81 [* pp. 241–48 of this volume].

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Österberg, Jan, 1996. “Value Based on Preferences”. Philosophy and Economics, 12: 1–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross W. D., 1930. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Swanton, Christine, 1995. “Profiles of the Virtues”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 27: 335–344.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tolhurst, William, 1983. “On the Nature of Intrinsic Value”. Philosophical Studies, 43: 383–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Velleman, J. David, 1999. “Love as a Moral Emotion”. Ethics, 109: 338–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Wright, G. H., 1963. The Varieties of Goodness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • von Wright, G. H., 1972. “The Logic of Preference Reconsidered”. Theory and Decision, 3: 140–169.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman, Michael J., 2001. The Nature of Intrinsic Value. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Rabinowicz, W., Rønnow-Rasmussen, T. (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake. In: Rønnow-Rasmussen, T., Zimmerman, M.J. (eds) Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3846-1_10

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics