Abstract
A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where S’s true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form “X occurred because Y occurred” require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that the position: (a) yields a better solution to the lottery problem, and (b) may be grounded in a more general theory of virtue and credit.
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Greco, J. (2004). A Different Sort of Contextualism. In: Brendel, E., Jäger, C. (eds) Contextualisms in Epistemology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3835-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3835-6_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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