A Deeper Solution for the International Commons

Abstract

The parable of the tragedy of the commons tells that resources held under open access conditions are prone to over-exploitation. For fisheries, regulations to limit aggregate catch improve resource use yet promote over-investment. Optimal regulation would limit the investments and labor dedicated to harvesting, a task quite difficult in a global forum. Motivated by three reasons, the member-states of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission have attempted such limits for the purse-seine yellowfin fishery, in addition to implementing other conservation measures. First, increases in fishing capacity by existing participants and newcomers have resulted in financial losses for the major fleets. Second, the resolution of the tuna-dolphin controversy encouraged additional harvesting capacity in an already-crowded fishery. Finally, bureaucratic changes in some countries have empowered fishery professionals who balance sustainable resource use with economic development. The strength of these influences, as well as efforts and concessions to create a regime, vary among the states involved.