Abstract
In Section 5.3 on page 161 we considered how we can sometimes unburden ourselves from the fatigue of reasoning—and particularly of teleological reasoning—by delegating it to others. However, this is not always possible, nor always advisable, since others may not be available or may not be sufficiently honest or competent, and relying too much on them would compromise our individual autonomy. Fortunately, when teleological reasoning is not practicable or opportune, a viable shortcut may still be available to a bounded cogniser, as we shall see in the next sections: This consists in relying on what we shall call propensities, the cognitive attitudes which can be doxified in the form of factor/outcome-links.
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(2005). Bounded Rationality: Factors. In: Roversi, C. (eds) A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_45
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_45
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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