Abstract
Our idea that normative states of affairs supervene upon optimal (though possibly relativised) practical cognition needs to stand a further challenge. This is provided by the idea of bounded rationality, namely, the idea that human rationality is a limited faculty, for which optimal cognition is often out of reach.
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© 2005 Springer
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(2005). Bounded Rationality: Cognitive Delegation. In: Roversi, C. (eds) A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_44
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3505-5_44
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-3387-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4020-3505-0
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