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How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie

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Nature’s Principles

Part of the book series: Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ((LEUS,volume 4))

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Authors
  1. Geert Keil
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Copenhagen, Denmark

    Jan Faye

  2. Stockholm University, Sweden

    Paul Needham

  3. Humboldt University Berlin, Germany

    Uwe Scheffler

  4. University of Konstanz, Germany

    Max Urchs

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Keil, G. (2005). How the Ceteris Paribus Laws of Physics Lie. In: Faye, J., Needham, P., Scheffler, U., Urchs, M. (eds) Nature’s Principles. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3258-7_7

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