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Backward Induction Without Tears?

  • Jordan Howard Sobel
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 2)

Keywords

Weak Solution Causal Decision Theory Inductive Generalization Robust Knowledge Traditional Idealisation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jordan Howard Sobel
    • 1
  1. 1.University of TorontoToronto

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