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Advances in Dynamic Games pp 397–420Cite as

A Stochastic Game Model of Tax Evasion

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Part of the book series: Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games ((AISDG,volume 8))

Abstract

The problem of tax evasion is modelled as a zero-sum two-person generalized stochastic game with incomplete information. This model incorporates the classical statistical classification procedures used in classifying a random observation from a mixed population. The model incorporates the secrecy of the tax office and lack of information about the past history of the taxpayer. With full information, the model is closer to certain structured classes of stochastic games that admit efficient algorithms for optimal solutions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics Statistics and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA

    T. E. S. Raghavan

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  1. T. E. S. Raghavan
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. ORDECSYS, Place de l’Etrier 4, Chêne-Bougeries, CH-1224, Switzerland

    Alain Haurie

  2. Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology, Tokyo Institute of Technology, 2-12-1 Ookayama, Tokyo, 152-8552, Japan

    Shigeo Muto

  3. Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, State University of St. Petersburg, 198504, St. Petersburg, Russia

    Leon A. Petrosjan

  4. Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60607-7045, USA

    T. E. S. Raghavan

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© 2006 Birkhäuser Boston

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Raghavan, T.E.S. (2006). A Stochastic Game Model of Tax Evasion. In: Haurie, A., Muto, S., Petrosjan, L.A., Raghavan, T.E.S. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 8. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4501-2_21

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