Abstract
The existence of Nash equilibria is investigated for one-stage and two-stage rent-seeking games with endogenous rent which depends on the aggregate expenditure by all rent-seeking agents such as individuals, firms or countries. Under reasonable assumptions on lottery production functions and rent function, both games turn out to have a unique equilibrium. The conditions for the equilibrium aggregate expenditure by all agents to increase in the first stage and for the total rent over two stages to dissipate are derived for the two-stage rent-seeking games.
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© 2005 Birkhäuser Boston
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Okuguchi, K. (2005). Existence of Nash Equilibria in Endogenous Rent-Seeking Games. In: Nowak, A.S., Szajowski, K. (eds) Advances in Dynamic Games. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, vol 7. Birkhäuser Boston. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4429-6_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-8176-4429-6_24
Publisher Name: Birkhäuser Boston
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