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Equilibrium Analysis for a Network Market Model

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Robust Optimization-Directed Design

Part of the book series: Nonconvex Optimization and Its Applications ((NOIA,volume 81))

Summary

In this paper we model and analyze a market equilibrium structure working on a network. The model is motivated by competition in electricity power generation markets, where consumers and producers are located in different nodes connected by power transmission lines. We analyze two different equilibrium concepts, namely, the Walrasian and the noncooperative Nash outcomes. By using concepts coming from Variational Analysis and Game Theory, we prove that both equilibria exist. Our existence proofs rely on fixed point theorems and epiconvergence stable approximations.

This work was partially supported by ICM Complex Engineering Systems.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford

    Juan F. Escobar

  2. Centro de Modelamiento Matemático and Departamento de Ingenieria Matematica, Universidad de Chile, Blanco Encalada 2120 7o. piso, Santiago, Chile

    Alejandro Jofré

Authors
  1. Juan F. Escobar
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  2. Alejandro Jofré
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida

    Andrew J. Kurdila  & Panos M. Pardalos  & 

  2. Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey

    Michael Zabarankin

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© 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

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Escobar, J.F., Jofré, A. (2006). Equilibrium Analysis for a Network Market Model. In: Kurdila, A.J., Pardalos, P.M., Zabarankin, M. (eds) Robust Optimization-Directed Design. Nonconvex Optimization and Its Applications, vol 81. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-28654-3_3

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