Abstract
The common law originally was thought to be immune to rent seeking. More recently, scholars have recognized that attorneys are engaged in exactly that activity. Rent seeking by the legal profession has greatly expanded the scope of US tort law, and generated efforts to reverse its expansion. Organized groups (attorneys, businesses and doctors) are active on both sides of the issue and the partisans have numerous tools available for advancing their agendas, such as litigating, lobbying for favorable rules and attempting to elect sympathetic legislators and judges. All of this creates an ideal setting for public choice analysis.
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Rubin, P.H. (2005). Public choice and tort reform. In: Shughart, W.F., Tollison, R.D. (eds) Policy Challenges and Political Responses. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-28038-3_12
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