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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C: ((TDLC,volume 38))

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BöS, D., Kolmar, M. (2005). Rent Seeking in Public Procurement. In: Schmidt, U., Traub, S. (eds) Advances in Public Economics: Utility, Choice and Welfare. Theory and Decision Library C:, vol 38. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25706-3_7

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