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Weingast, B.R. (2005). The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_8
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