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McCubbins, M.D. (2005). Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_7
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