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Spiller, P.T., Tommasi, M. (2005). The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_21
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