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Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking

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Handbook of New Institutional Economics

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Authors
  1. Benito Arruñada
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  2. Veneta Andonova
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France

    Claude Menard

  2. The Ronald Coase Institute, Chevy Chase, MD, USA

    Mary M. Shirley

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Arruñada, B., Andonova, V. (2005). Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking. In: Menard, C., Shirley, M.M. (eds) Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-25092-1_11

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