Abstract
Groups of six females or six males play the minimal effort coordination game for ten periods. Small differences in coordination are found in the initial stages but not in the final stages. Besides reporting this result, we raise a methodological issue: Is there a bias in the research community against reporting or publishing results that document the absence of a gender effect? If so, there is a risk of bias in perceptions regarding the magnitude and limits of gender differences.
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Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy, U. (2005). Gender & Coordination. In: Zwick, R., Rapoport, A. (eds) Experimental Business Research. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24244-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-24244-9_11
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