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Possible End Games in the European Postal Market

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  • Conference paper
Regulatory and Economic Challenges in the Postal and Delivery Sector

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy ((TREP,volume 48))

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8. Conclusion

In this paper we asked ourselves a number of questions: who will benefit from the liberalization of the European postal market, what will the end game of the European postal market look like and how can smaller states secure an equitable share of the benefits given the current fact of asymmetrical liberalization and differences in sizes of home markets. We may assume, on the basis of the historical process of liberalization of markets, that in the long run the full liberalization of the European markets will positively contribute to the welfare of all member states. With economies of scale being so important for postal services, and its related markets of express and logistics, the companies with large home markets such as Deutsche Post and La Poste are in the advantage conform the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. We therefore believe that the future stable competitive configuration will more likely be one in which 2 or 3 powerful players lead the market, with perhaps some smaller players serving purely local markets (and which will be contained by the larger powers in their possibility to expand). The current practice of asymmetrical liberalization supports this development, as it limits the growth of postal operators from smaller companies, thereby deteriorating their future competitive position in a liberalized and integrated European postal market. To create a fair playing ground between larger and smaller countries, the European Commission should implement a -temporary- reciprocity rule, allowing national governments to block foreign companies operating from a non-liberalized home market, to enter (segments of) their national postal market, be it through an owned start-up or through mergers and acquisitions. However, in the end there needs to be a fully liberalized European postal market. The proposed reciprocity rule is a fair measure since companies from small countries are at a disadvantage, even in case of reciprocity, because of their small home markets. The rule should be used to allow the smaller member states to speed up the innovation in their economies in order to absorb the free-falling production factors in case their national postal and logistics clusters cannot compete in an integrated European market. Also, the European Commission needs to view the future development of the postal services no longer as a stand-alone business, but as an integral part of the business of logistic services, since the dynamics of that industry define the dynamics of the postal services.

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Strikwerda, J., Rijnders, D. (2005). Possible End Games in the European Postal Market. In: Crew, M.A., Kleindorfer, P.R. (eds) Regulatory and Economic Challenges in the Postal and Delivery Sector. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 48. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23637-6_15

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