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Brennan, T.J. (2005). Regulation and Competition as Complements. In: Crew, M.A., Crew, M.A., Spiegel, M. (eds) Obtaining the Best from Regulation and Competition. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 47. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-23196-X_1

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