Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Intervention of Private Entities and States as “Friends of the Court” in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings

  • Chapter
The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis

Abstract

In these days, the global legitimacy of the WTO is frequently being called into question by “civil society”, and particularly by the NGOs. One of the chief criticisms is that the WTO’s decisions, and especially those taken within the dispute settlement context, are arrived at “behind closed doors” and take into account only the trade-offs between State interests, with no consideration for the rights and interests of private individuals. To make up for these shortcomings, the NGOs and various private bodies, including those that represent the multinationals, are demanding, among other things, the right to join the proceedings as “friends of the court” and, in that capacity, to submit amicus curiae briefs.

I would like to thank Gabrielle Marceau of the WTO and Arthur E. Appleton, attorney in Geneva, for having kindly read through and commented on this contribution, as well as for the always very stimulating discussions I have had with them. I also would like to thank Zasova Svetlana for editing work on this chapter.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 429.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 549.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. For a general approach to the question of the role of the NGOs and amicus curiae, see Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Proceedings, 88 American Journal of International Law 611–619 (1994); Raymond Ranjeva, Les organisations non-gouvernementales et la mise en oeuvre du droit international, 270 Recueil Des Cours de l’académie de Droit International 9–106 (1997); Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 897–929 (2001); Philippe Sands, Le droit international, le praticien et les acteurs non étatiques, in L’émergence de la société Civile Internationale—Vers la Privatisation du Droit International, (Pedone 2003).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (1998), ¶ 101 (emphasis in original).

    Google Scholar 

  3. Report of the WTO Panel, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (1999), ¶ ¶ 7.72 and 7.73.

    Google Scholar 

  4. United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 129.

    Google Scholar 

  5. With regard to the diversification of the actors in international relations, see Brigitte Stern, Etats et souverainet é: la souveraineté de l’Etat face à la mondialisation, in Universite de Tous Les Savoirs: Qu’est-Ce Que la Societe? 828–839 (Odile Jacob ed., 2000).

    Google Scholar 

  6. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 108.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Id. ¶ 110.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Id. ¶ 104 (emphasis in original).

    Google Scholar 

  9. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 109.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law 477, 485 (1999).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 83.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Id. ¶ 86.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Id. ¶ 89.

    Google Scholar 

  14. See Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 487.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  15. As Hélène Ruiz Fabri has pointed out, “the Appellate Body’s final position amounts to neutralizing the problem...As with the composition of delegations (in the Bananas case), the government barrier may be regarded as having been maintained”, in Chronique du règlement des différends. 1996–1998, 2 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 497 (1999).

    Google Scholar 

  16. Gregory Schaffer, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, 93 American Journal of International Law 510 (1999).

    Google Scholar 

  17. James Cameron and Karen Campbell, Dispute Resolution in The World Trade Organization 227 (1998).

    Google Scholar 

  18. See Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 494.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Carbon Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, (“United States—Lead and Bismuth II”) WT/DS138/AB/R (2000), ¶ 39.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Id. ¶ 41.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Id. ¶ 42.

    Google Scholar 

  22. Report of the Appellate Body, U.S.—Carbon Steel, supra note 25, ¶ 42.

    Google Scholar 

  23. On this case see, in particular, Geert A. Zonnenkeyn, The Appellate Body’s Communication on Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Asbestos Case, 35 Journal of World Trade 553 (2001).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  24. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC-Asbestos”) WT/DS135/AB/R (2001), ¶ 50.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Requirements undoubtedly closely modeled on those suggested by Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell in their article entitled Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 155 (2001).

    Google Scholar 

  26. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Trade Description of Sardines (“EC—Sardines”), WT/DS231/AB/R (2002), ¶ 161.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Id. ¶ 155.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Id. ¶ 65.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Id. ¶ 111.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Id. ¶ 157.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Id. ¶ 162, citing United States—Lead and Bismuth II supra note 25, ¶ 39 n.58.

    Google Scholar 

  32. EC—Sardines, supra note 36, ¶ 162 (emphasis in original).

    Google Scholar 

  33. Id. ¶ 166. (emphasis in original).

    Google Scholar 

  34. Id. ¶ 167.

    Google Scholar 

  35. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Shrimp, supra note 2, ¶ 106 (emphasis in original).

    Google Scholar 

  36. Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Lead and Bismuth II, supra note 25, ¶ 36. Cf. the position of the European Communities in another case cited below, namely, United States—Section 110(5) of U.S. Copyright Act—Report of the Panel, WT/DS160/R (2000), ¶ 6.5 (emphasis in original).

    Google Scholar 

  37. Report of the WTO Panel, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon—Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, WT/DS18/RW (2000), ¶ 7.9.

    Google Scholar 

  38. See Report of the WTO Panel, United States—Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R (1999), ¶ 6.3.

    Google Scholar 

  39. Report of the WTO Panel, United States—Section 110 (5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (2000), ¶ 6.5.

    Google Scholar 

  40. Report of the WTO Panel, European Communities—Anti-dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen From India, WT/DS141/R (2000), ¶ 6.1 and n.10.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Report of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (2000), ¶ 8.12.

    Google Scholar 

  42. EC-Asbestos, supra note 32, ¶ 56.

    Google Scholar 

  43. Report of the Appellate Body, Thailand—Anti-Dumping Duties on—Angles, Shapes and Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/AB/R (2001).

    Google Scholar 

  44. Id. ¶ 67.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Id. ¶ 72.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Id. ¶ 74.

    Google Scholar 

  47. Id. ¶¶ 76 and 78.

    Google Scholar 

  48. To that should be added the possibility, if not of collusion, at least of a conflict of interest between an NGO and a member of a panel or the Appellate Body. It is worth recalling the withdrawal of an English law lord from the Pinochet case, because of his links with Amnesty International which had been authorized to submit an amicus curiae brief. This led to a second hearing before the House of Lords. House of Lords, Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division); Regina v. Evans and Another and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others (Appellants), Ex Parte Pinochet (Respondent) (On Appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division), Judgment of March 24, 1999, 38 ILM 581–663 (1999).

    Google Scholar 

  49. See Ascensio, supra Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2001) note 1, at 918–919.

    Google Scholar 

  50. Meeting of November 6, 1998, WT/DSB/M/50, December 14, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Id. at 2, 3 and 4 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  52. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  53. Id. at 7 and 8 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  54. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  55. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  56. Id. at 16–17 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  57. DSB meeting held on June 7, 2000, WT/DSB/M/83, June 7, 2000.

    Google Scholar 

  58. Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  59. Id. ¶ 14.

    Google Scholar 

  60. Id. ¶ 15 (emphasis added). In addition, “Brazil noted that the question of who could be heard by panels and the Appellate Body was not a ‘procedural rule’, but rather a very substantive component of the DSU rules, which affected the way the system operated and significantly altered the rights and obligations Members negotiated under the Uruguay Round”, WT/GC/M/60 ¶ 43.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added).

    Google Scholar 

  62. WT/DSB/M/92, January 15, 2001.

    Google Scholar 

  63. Id. ¶ 128.

    Google Scholar 

  64. See Report of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, January 23, 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  65. Factual Background Note Relating to the Issue Raised by Certain Members, Circulated in Job(00)/7343 and reference in Report of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, January 23, 2002.

    Google Scholar 

  66. Report of the Meeting, WT/GC/M/60, January 23, 2002, ¶ 74.

    Google Scholar 

  67. Comment by Egypt on behalf of the informal group of developing countries at the meeting of the General Council on November 22, 2000, WT/GC/M/60,¶ 18.

    Google Scholar 

  68. See Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 487–488; and EC—Sardines, supra note 36, ¶¶ 153–170, where the Appellate Body received an amicus submission from the Kingdom of Morocco.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  69. As noted, for example, by Asif Qureshi, Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGO’s and the WTO Appellate Body,48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 205 (January 1999): “... The NGOs do not need to prove the veracity of their statements. The onus of rebuttal falls on the parties in question. Indeed, conceivably, NGO submissions could have the effect of shifting, or at any rate partly distorting, the onus of proof as set out in the Understanding.”

    Google Scholar 

  70. Report of the Appellate Body, Japan—Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R (1999), ¶ 129.

    Google Scholar 

  71. Id. ¶ 130.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Georg C. Umbricht, An “Amicus Curiae Brief” on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 779 (2001).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  73. Ascensio, supra Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2001) note 1, at 900.

    Google Scholar 

  74. See e.g., Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 164–175 (2001).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  75. See e.g., Bertrand Badie et Marie-Claude Smouts, Le Retournement du Monde: Sociologie de la Scene Internationale (1995).

    Google Scholar 

  76. Umbricht, supra Georg C. Umbricht, An “Amicus Curiae Brief” on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001) note 104, at 785–786.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  77. WT/GC/M/60 ¶ 21. Cf. the similar comments of Pakistan: “[w]ith regard to the manner in which this communication had been sent, i.e., to NGOs on the WTO e-mailing list, there was clearly an inherent discrimination since the largest number of NGOs from developing countries did not have access to the internet and were not on the WTO e-mailing list”. Georg C. Umbricht, An “Amicus Curiae Brief” on Amicus Curiae Briefs at the WTO, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001) Id. ¶ 66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  78. DSB meeting of June 7, 2000, WT/DSB/M/83, July 7, 2000 ¶ 8.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Ascensio, supra Hervé Ascensio, L’amicus curiae devant les juridictions internationales, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (2001) note 1, at 898.

    Google Scholar 

  80. Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell, supra Gabrielle Marceau and Matthew Stilwell, Practical Suggestions for Amicus Curiae Briefs Before WTO Adjudicating Bodies, 4 Journal of International Economic Law (2001) note 106, at 164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  81. See, in particular, the NAFTA arbitration in an international investment case involving a government and an investor, Methanex Corporation v. United States, Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae”, January 15, 2001, http://www.naftalaw.org or http://www.international-economic-law.org.See also another NAFTA arbitration along the same lines, United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Canada, October 17, 2001. On this question, see Brigitte Stern, L’entrée de la societe civile dans l’arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur, 2 Revue de l’arbitrage 329 (2002).

  82. Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 494.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  83. Arthur E. Appleton, Amicus Curiae Submissions in the Carbon Steel Case: Another Rabbit from the Appellate Body’s Hat?, 3 Journal of International Economic Law 691, 699 (2000).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  84. Appleton, supra Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) note 16, at 477. One commentator has written that “Amicus briefs from nongovernmental organizations could further enhance the legitimacy, and acceptance, of the WTO dispute settlement process”. See Thomas Cottier, The WTO and Environmental Law: Three Points for Discussion, in Trade and Environment: Bridging the Gap 59 (James Cameron and Agata Fijalkowski eds. 1998).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  85. Ian Brownlie, The Individual Before Tribunals Exercising International Jurisdiction, 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 719 (1962). See also, Shabtaï Rosenne, Reflections on the Position of the Individual in Inter-State Litigation in the International Court of Justice, in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke 250 (Philippe Sanders eds. 1967).

    Article  Google Scholar 

  86. See EC—Asbestos, supra note 32.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Panthéon-Sorbonne and the Graduate Institute of International Studies, University of Paris 1, Geneva

    Brigitte Stern (Professor)

Authors
  1. Brigitte Stern
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. International Trade Law Center, International Law Institute, Washington, D.C.

    Patrick F. J. Macrory (Director) (Director)

  2. White & Case, Geneva

    Arthur E. Appleton (Counsel) (Counsel)

  3. SAIS-Bologna, Johns Hopkins University, Bologna

    Michael G. Plummer (Professor of International Economics) (Professor of International Economics)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Stern, B. (2005). The Intervention of Private Entities and States as “Friends of the Court” in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings. In: Macrory, P.F.J., Appleton, A.E., Plummer, M.G. (eds) The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-22688-5_32

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation