Conclusion
There might be a need for intensive study of virtues. We are even willing to concede that this enterprise will be a real improvement for analytic moral philosophy as it reintroduces a variety of neglected topics into modern ethical theorizing. Thinking about virtues might lead to a deeper understanding of our moral life and moral practice:
In ancient Greece, moral philosophy started as a study of ethical and social excellence. But over the centuries, this enterprise has become trivial: The search for moral excellence degenerated into an analysis of the question how to prevent moral faults [...]13
The various studies of virtues could be regarded as an attempt to halt this process of trivialization. But it is not necessary to demand a new start or even a revival. All we need for a good working virtue ethics already exists in nuce in the work of Moritz Schlick. Therefore, prospering in virtue ethics does not mean quitting analytic ethics, but going back to its beginnings and having a look at its roots.
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© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Borchers, D. (2003). “Let’s Talk about Flourishing!” — Moritz Schlick and the Non-cognitive Foundation of Virtue Ethics. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 10. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-48214-2_9
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