NaÏve Probability

  • Paolo Legrenzi
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 237)


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  1. Johnson-Laird, P. N., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M. and Caverni, J. P. 1999. “Naïve Probability: A Model Theory of Extensional Reasoning”. Psychological Review 106: 62–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Legrenzi, M., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, P. and Johnson-Laird, P.N.F. Forthcoming. Reasoning to Consistency: A Theory of Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Google Scholar
  3. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1983. “Extensional versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment”. Psychological Review 90: 293–315.Google Scholar
  4. Tversky, A. and Koehler, D.K. 1994. “Support theory”. Psychological Review 101: 547–567.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paolo Legrenzi
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of ArchitectureIUAVVeniceItaly

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