Abstract
New Zealand (NZ) has the fourth highest per capita emissions (on a cumulative basis) on the planet. However, NZ does not have to make the average 5% cuts in greenhouse gases that most other Annex I countries have to make following Kyoto. Moreover, with the current way the Kyoto Protocol is structured, it is possible that positive economic impacts will result for NZ. These benefits will be achieved with minimum disturbance of the market as it currently operates. Although this may be ‘good’ for NZ, it may also be highly counterproductive to achieving a solution to what may be the biggest environmental problem to face the planet in the next century.
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References
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New Zealand ratified the FCCC on 18 September 1993. It was the 34th country to do so.
This was accepted as a formal target in Ministry for the Environment, Climate Change: The New Zealand Response. New Zealand’s First National Communication Under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (1994), at 7.
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Delegation Brief, supra note 27, at 2. This blow-out from the perspective of the net approach is due to the high rate of absorption when the counting started in 1990, as well as a failure to reach the necessary planting rates needed to contain the already sequested carbon and the growth in gross carbon dioxide emissions.
AOSIS Protocol. INC. A/AC.237/L.23. 27 September 1994. Article 3 (l)(a) of the Draft Protocol suggested that each of the Annex 1 parties shall, ‘Reduce its level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide by at least 20% by the year 2005.’ The Protocol is included in this volume as Appendix 3.
See NZPA, Greenhouse Gas Policy Under Fire, N.Z. Herald, 1 Apr. 1995, at 5; New Zealand Supporting Island Nations, N.Z. Herald, 6 Apr. (1995), at 9; New Zealand Takes Lonely Stand At Climate Summit, N.Z. Herald, 7 Apr. 1995, at 15. The specific justifications for this can be found in the Delegation document, Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand Intervention, 1995. February 8: Agenda Item 7 B: Review of the Adequacy of the Commitments (1995).
The Berlin Mandate: Decision. 1/CP. 1 (1995).
The NZ target is a 0% increase from the 1992 FCCC target by the end of the first commitment period (2008–2012). That compares with an average for developed countries of around -5%, and a target for the US of -7%. The precise targets vary among countries on a ‘differentiated’ basis, ranging from Iceland, at the upper limit, which received a target of 110% of its 1990 level; Australia — 108%, NZ — 100%, Canada and Japan — 94%, US — 93%, and the EU — 92%. The cumulative reduction, should (according to Article 3) be in the order of 5%. See Ministry of Environment, Kyoto Outcome: A Summary, 1 Dec. 1997, at 17.
This is not to suggest that New Zealand had not formulated a response to climate change before 1994. Indeed, prior to this time three important reports were issued by the New Zealand Climate Change Programme, operating through the Ministry for the Environment. However, it was not until 1994 that a specific method to reduce carbon emissions was formally introduced. See Ministry for the Environment, Exploring the Options for Reducing Net Emissions of Carbon Dioxide: Consultation Document. Ministry for the Environment (1994).
See G. Palmer, Environmental Politics: A Greenprint For New Zealand (1990), at 59–75.
Minister for the Environment, Upton Announces Climate Change Position, Press Release, 2 Dec. 1997.
S. Upton, Address to NZ National Committee, in National Committee, World Energy Council, Impacts of Climate Change Policy on New Zealand Incorporated (1994), at 2, 3–4. See also The New Zealand Response, supra note 24, at 7.
R.K. Dixon et al., Conservation and Sequestration of Carbon: The Potential of Forest and Agro-forest Management Practices, Global Environmental Change (June, 1993), at 159, 168–169. 172.
A. Chisholm & A. Moran, A Perspective on the Potential Economic Impacts of Climate Change Policy in New Zealand, in Impacts of Climate Change Policy on New Zealand Incorporated. (New Zealand National Committee of World Energy Council ed. 1994), at 1, 7–9. The argument that the planting of carbon sinks was not a ‘costly option’ was accepted by the Board of Inquiry, Proposed Taranki Power Station: Air Discharge Effects (The ‘Stratford Inquiry’) (1995). See paragraphs 9.55, 9.57–9.62, 9.62.
This net approach was recognised by the INC at its first session. See Decision 1/1 which refers to ‘appropriate commitments… for limiting and reducing net emissions of carbon dioxide and other gases.’ [emphasis added] Report of the Inter governmental Negotiating Committee For A Framework Convention on Climate Change on the Work of its First Session. U.N. GAOR. INC/FCCC, 1st Sess. U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/6 (1991), at 24. The approach was favoured by certain countries as it took the pressure off to reduce specific gases, such as carbon dioxide. Theoretically, this should allow countries some ‘breathing time’ as they can concentrate on other ways to reduce greenhouse emissions. See W.A. Nitze, A Failure of Presidential Leadership, in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention (I.M. Mintzer ed., 1994), at 187–189.
New Zealand Response, supra note 24, at 9–10.
The Stratford Inquiry, supra note 39.
Stratford Inquiry; Greenpeace and Eco Submission, 1994, in possession of the author.
Paragraph 12.2 (23) concluded that ‘Mitigation… of the adverse environmental effects of allowing the discharge of C02 could be carried out by ongoing planting of a sufficient number of trees to act as a permanent carbon sink. The imposition of a mitigation condition to this effect would be reasonable and practicable in the circumstance.’ Stratford Inquiry, supra note 39.
Thus, ‘The FCCC in effect urges a net approach since it is worded in terms of both reducing the emissions and enhancing absorption.’ Stratford Inquiry, supra note 39, para. 4.44 (i). See also paras. 4.30 – 4.34, 9.2, 9.14–9.21, 10.8, 12.4 (4).
Working Group, supra note 26, at 66–71.
Supra note 32.
Cabinet Committee on Enterprise, Industry & Environment, Reviewing The Government’s Climate Change Policy, 26 June 1995.
P. Brown, Kyoto Fails Test on Climate Change, Guardian Int’l, 14 December 1997.
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Draft Supplementary, Note to Minister Re: AGBM8, 31 October 1997, at 1.
Kyoto Outcome, supra note 34, at 2.
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Only in the UK and Australia were these areas not a sink. That is, they were a source of emissions. For Australia, they added 24% and for the UK it was a 3% increase. See id., Table 1.
Id. By 1997, the projected removal rate over the period 1990–2020 had fallen to 63% of the response of dealing with the gross carbon dioxide emissions from energy sources and industrial processes, Climate Change: The New Zealand Response II, Second National Communication under the FCCC (1997), at 9, 78.
See International Energy Agency/OECD, Climate Change Initiatives: 1994 Update, OECD Countries (1995), at 19–23.
Technical Paper, supra note 58, at 4–11. The specific results to the questionnaire on sinks can be found in United Nations, Response From Parties on Issues Relating to Sinks, FCCC/AGBM/1997/ MISC.4. & MISC.4.Add 1. & MISCAAdd 2, Ministry for the Environment (1997), Draft Supplementary Note to Minister Re: AGBM8., 31 Oct. 1997, at 1. Minister for the Environment, supra note 37; The Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change, Earth Negotiations Bull. (ENB) 12 (67): 1; 12(71): 1; 12 (76): 1,2,3; 8 ECO Newsletter, 9 December 1997, at 3; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The Third Session of the Conference of the Parties: The New Zealand Delegation Report (1997), at 4.
SeeNational Academy of Sciences, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming: Mitigation, Adoption and the Science Basis (1992), at 76–77.
Indeed, paragraph 21 of the 1989 Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Climate Change calls for an additional 12 million hectares of forests to be planted by the year 2000. This document is reprinted in 5 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y (1990), at 592. For the general recognition of the importance of sinks, See Principle 2(b) and Principle 4 of the Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles For a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of all Types of Forests. UNCED. A/CONF. 151/26 (Vol. III) 14 August 1992.
See After Kyoto, Energy Wise News, 13 April 1998.
NZ Intervention, December 2, Committee of the Whole, FCCC, COP 3. Kyoto. 1, Draft Supplementary Note to Minister Re: AGBM8, 31 October (1997), at 1.
Statement on Behalf of New Zealand, the Honourable Simon Upton, Minister for the Environment, Plenary, FCCC. COP 3, 8 December 1997, at 2.
Id. at arts. 4.1 & 4.2
Id. at art. II 2(a). “by sources and removals by sinks…”
Response From Parties, supra note 62, FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.4, at 12. See also the United Kingdom (On behalf of the EU), United Nations, Response From the Parties; see also Issues Relating to Sinks, FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.4. Add 1. (1997), at 22.
Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, at 35.
IPCC, Second Assessment Report, Vol. 2. (1995).
For example, it is difficult to obtain accurate estimates of carbon sequestration rates for different species of trees, accurate information on the type of land being planted; the effects that mass planting will have on volatile hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide. Information is also required to improve the understanding of the carbon exchanges between soil, forest and atmosphere; as well as decomposition and storage times of carbon deposited after soil erosion. There is also a need to develop sequestration models for indigenous as well as plantation forests. Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, at 35–36. These problems have also been reflected on the international stage. For example, Borine and Ripert stated, “It is in fact quite impossible, in the present state of scientific knowledge, to aggregate on a common basis the figures of reductions of emissions of the different greenhouse gases… it is also difficult at this stage, to identify and to quantify all the sinks. Commitments on net emissions could therefore be considered impossible to implement.” D. Borine & J. Ripert, Exercising Common But Differentiated Responsibilities, Mintzer, supra note 40, at 77, 88. See also K. Brown & N. Adger, Estimating National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Climate Change Convention, Global Environmental Change, June, 1995, at 145–158.
Noted by the Marshall Islands, Response From Parties, supra note 62.
United Nations, Compilation of Responses From Parties on Issues Related to Sinks: Comments from Parties & Note By Secretariat, FCCC/AGBM/1997/INF.2. 29 November (1997), 3, 4–11.
IPCC, Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (1996), at A1 – 1, Table A1 – 1.
New Zealand, Response From Parties, supra note 62, FCCC/AGBM/1997/ MISC.4, at 40.
Australia, Response From Parties, supra note 62, FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.4. Add 1, at 7.
The Technical Paper on sinks, supra note 58, noted that “None of the problems with comparability of C02 emission estimates from this sector identified in the compilation and synthesis of first national communications appear to be resolved. The information provided did not shed additional light on various assumptions related to the definitions of anthropogenic activities and their treatment for emissions reporting purposes.” FCCC/SBI/1997/19, Annex, para 29.
Marshall Islands, Response From Parties, supra note 62, FCCC/AGBM/1997/MISC.4, at 18.
See SBSTA, Methodological Issues: Issues Related to Land Use Change and Forestry. FCCC/ SBSTA/1998/INF. 1(1998).
This category originally (1995) included changes in forests and other woods biomass stocks; forests and grasslands conversion and abandonment of managed lands. In 1996 the IPCC added changes in mineral soil carbon stocks.
With such considerations in mind, the Technical Paper on sinks concluded, “It is clear that further methodological work is necessary in order to ensure that the estimation and reporting of GHG inventory data for land-use change and forestry are consistent, transparent and comparable.” Technical Paper, supra note 58, at 10. Very similar conclusions were reached with the compilation and synthesis of the second national communications, “[F]urther research and methodological work is needed to ensure that estimation and reporting is done in a consistent, transparent, and comparable manner.” FCCC/SBI/1997/19, Annex, para 29.
The specific language agreed upon in Article 3 (3) stipulated, “The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in stocks in each commitment period shall be used to meet commitments in this Article of each party included in Annex I.” (emphasis added) Use Change and Forestry. FCCC/SBSTA/1998/INF.l. The definitional concerns with these are such that depending of which approaches are taken, forests could either be classified as sources or sinks. See J. Green-ough, et al., Influence of Methodology and Assumptions on Reported National Carbon Flux Inventories, 2 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change (1997), at 267–283. At Kyoto, there was serious concern over the parameters of this article. “Sink” is defined in Article 1 of the FCCC to mean “any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or precursor of a greenhouse gas into the atmosphere.” The Protocol does not cover “all” forests, but is limited to direct human-induced land use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation. The question of whether this includes natural/indigenous forests was addressed within the IPCC Guidelines which state that natural, undisturbed forests, where still in equilibrium should not be considered either as an anthropogenic source or sink, and should therefore be excluded from the national inventory calculations. Of course, the question that arises is — what about undisturbed forests that are not in equilibrium? As it stands, the protection and enhancement of carbon sinks and reservoirs, including commercially planted forests and indigenous forests are a central part of NZ’s policy. However, the scientific research on the role of indigenous forests and sinks has been “slow” and it is likely that “it will be some years before the source/sink situation of our indigenous forests with respect to C02 can be clarified.” It is still “not known whether this reservoir is expanding or shrinking, i.e., whether it is a sink or source.” Second National Communication, supra note 60, at 9. See also Royal Society of NZ, National Science Strategy Committee for Climate Change (1996), at 7, 17. This last consideration is of particular concern, as the net approach has, to date, only been built upon the sequestration by planted forests and has largely ignored the sequestration of carbon (or emissions) by indigenous forests. The distinct problem is that no-one is certain how much carbon is being held in these forest, which make up around 95% of New Zealand’s forest cover, or how much is being released through residual clearances by humans or by non-anthropogenic natural phenomena, from fires to opossums. These losses or net sequestration could throw off New Zealand’s national net estimates of carbon dioxide by up to 300% either way. Working Group, supra note 26, at 58–59 & 61–61.
Kyoto Protocol, at art. 3(4).
Id. at arts 3(4) & 5.
Nauru Response, United Nations, Response From Parties on Issues Relating to Sinks. FCCC/ AGBM/1997/MISC.4 (1997), at 27.
Nauru, the Marshall Islands and Kenya all made similar points on this issue. See Response From Parties, id, MISC4.pp.28. & MISC. Add 1, at 19.
For example, it was estimated in 1994 that planting rates of around 100,000 extra hectares each year would be required to offset our carbon dioxide emissions. This planting rate never transpired, topping off at approximately 70,000 hectares per year. This is insufficient to maintain the high levels of sequestration achieved in 1990 (the base year of the FCCC obligations) and gross carbon dioxide emissions that are substantially higher than predicted. The result has been a substantial abyss between what was projected and what has actually been achieved. The New Zealand Response, supra note 24, at 40; Working Group, supra note 26, at 61–62.
For example, just to keep pace with global carbon dioxide emissions (about 3.2 billion tonnes per year), would necessitate planting trees in an area the size of India annually. Even if all the available land was reforested, — approximately 4 million square kilometres (about half the size of Australia) even then, only 10% of the estimated emissions from fossil fuel burning world wide would be achieved by sequestration. This is especially the case in a number of developing countries where there are other demands for the land that may be accorded higher priority. See S.H. Schneider, Global Warming (1989), at 188–189;
W.N. Adger & K. Brown, Land Use and the Causes of Global Warming (1994), at 189–195 & 227–230.
The balance of equities is clearly tipped against New Zealand given its rather prolific historical record of anthropogenic releases of greenhouse gases through deforestation, agricultural and industrial practices. Because greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide have life spans up to 200 years, the gases that New Zealand released over the past few centuries may still be having an effect upon the climate system. See IPCC, 1994; supra note 20, at 32–34. The current emissions total that is extrapolated from the 1990 base year of the FCCC, only reflects a “snap-shot” of any given year, as opposed to, for example, a 150 year period. The importance of historical contributions is recognised in paragraph 3 of the Preamble, which states “that the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions from developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.” Additionally, paragraph 6 of the preamble identifies “the differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” of the parties. This differentiation of response measures is operationalised in Article 4, which distinguishes between the commitments of developed and developing countries. Thus, as Justin Ford-Robertson noted, ‘Trees planted now, even if they sequestrate C02 only serve to credit the historical carbon debt that New Zealand has incurred due to earlier deforestation and consequent release of carbon to the atmosphere.’ The Carbon Balance of Plantation Forestry in New Zealand A Report for Greenpeace New Zealand (1993), at 23.
See V. Bhaskar, Distributive Justice and the Case of Global Warming, in The North, The South and the Environment: Ecological Constraints and the Global Economy (V. Bhaskar & A. Glyn eds., 1995), at 102, 103, 105, 115–116; C. Dasgupta, The Climate Change Negotiations, in Mintzer, supra note 40, at 129, 133–136; A. Rahman, A View From the Ground Up, id. at 239, 263.
Energy Foundation of New Zealand, Global Warming: An Alternative Perspective (1993), at 20.
Climate Change Initiatives, supra note 61, at 19–26.
World Resources Institute & the United Nations Environmental Programme, World Resources 1994–1995: A Guide to the Global Environment (1995), at 201–203.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 53, at 6.
“Whether our per-capita… emissions are comparatively high is irrelevant…,” R. Chapman & L. Gray, Responding to Global Warming: A Critique of Al Gillespie’s Burning Issues, N.Z. J. Envtl. L., at 4 (draft).
Marshall Islands, United Nations, Response From Parties on Issues Relating to Sinks, FCCC/ AGBM/1997/MISC.4 (1997), at 22.
New Zealand, Response From Parties, id. at 40.
S. Upton, New Zealand’s Climate Change Policy: Speech to the Energy Foundation of NZ, 31 October 1997, at 8.
Ministry for the Environment, 6 The State of New Zealand’s Environment: 1997 (1997), at 32; M. Ulyatt, Is Emission Control Technology Advanced Enough to Control or Monitor Emissions Other Than Carbon Dioxide? in Greenhouse Gases and C0 2 Policy, supra note 14, at Chs. 2 & 18.
This will change over a very long period of time, with carbon dioxide emissions ultimately expected to eclipse methane.
Livestock digestive processes account for 39.9%; animal waste 0.5%, landfills 3.5%; wastewater 0.1%, and energy 1.0%.
See Ministry for the Environment, Climate Change: More Than Just Carbon Dioxide, (1998), at vii.
Ulyatt, supra note 101.
. Id.
IPCC, supra note 20, at 32–34.
NZ’s remaining non-C02 greenhouse gases are SF6 (sulphur hexafluoride), HFCs (hydrofluorocar-bons) & PFCs (perfluorcarbons). These make up less than 0.5% of the total greenhouse gas emissions for NZ.
Around 94% of this originates in the agricultural sector, from animal waste, soil processes and nitrogen fertiliser.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at ix.
”A comprehensive approach, covering all gases in a basket, and sink.” NZ Intervention. 1997, 2 Dec. 1997, Committee of the Whole. FCCC, COP 3. Kyoto, at 1.
See The Third Conference, supra note 56; Late Paper, supra note 51. See also P. McCully, Discord in the Greenhouse: How the WRI Is Attempting to Shift the Blame for Global Warming, 21 Ecologist (1991), at 213.
M. Redclift, Throwing Stones in the Greenhouse, Global Environmental Change (June, 1992), at 90–92
The Third Conference, supra note 21; ENB, supra note 62, at 1–2.
Due to uncertainties with these, Article 5 of the Kyoto Protocol suggests that GWPs shall be those agreed to by the IPCC and the COP, and these may be revised in the future.
Late Paper, supra note 51, at 4. This approach originated with the World Research Institute, Greenhouse Warming: Negotiating A Global Regime (1991). See also World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990–1991 (1990), at 14–18. See also, A.L. Hammond, et al., Calculating National Accountability for Climate Change, 33(1) Environment (1991), at 11–35.
Report on Climate Change, supra note 17, at 35.
New Zealand Delegation Brief supra note 27, at paras. 15 & 16. See also D. Taylor, New Zealand and the Climate Change Convention: Where to Now?, in New Zealand and the Climate Change Convention: Where to Now (New Zealand National Committee of the World Energy Council ed., 1995).
Minister for the Environment, Points to Note Regarding Attached Reports on Modelling Impacts For NZ of Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions (1997), at 1.
Chapman and Gray, supra note 97, at 3.
Chapman and Gray, supra note 97, at 4.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at 7. This produces “a good deal… for many developed countries.” S. Upton, Address to the Royal Institute of International Affairs: Climate Change, Addressing the Real Issues, 19 Sept. 1997, at 4. At this point it needs to be asked whether one country should be allowed to claim a benefit i.e., increased emission space to be filled by rising C02 emissions, because of a fortuitous occurrence that creates less emissions than predicted? Should such a fortuitous outcome be an excuse to reduce need to control emissions in another field ?
Chapman & Gray, supra note 97, at 3–4.
Upton, supra note 100, at 2.
This uncertainty is particularly pronounced in the context of GWPs for non-C02 gases. The National Science Strategy Committee for Climate Change noted in 1997, “there is a level of uncertainty in global warming potential’s, typically of the order of-/+ 35%.” This is particularly true in terms of methane and nitrous oxide. Royal Society of New Zealand, National Science Strategy Committee for Climate Change (1997), at 15. The Minister for the Environment has also noted that “the measurement uncertainty for non-C02 emissions and net C02 removals by sinks is higher than for energy emissions. In reality, due to uncertainty, emissions projections could be significantly higher or lower than the central estimate figures presented.” Late Paper, supra note 51, at Annex A.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at viii.
IPCC, supra note 76, at Al-1, Table A1–1.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at viii.
IPCC, supra note 76, at A1 – 1, Table Al-1.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at 14 & 17, Royal Society of New Zealand, supra note 84, at 17.
Royal Society of New Zealand, supra note 124, at 24.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at 13.
Id.
OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews: New Zealand (1996), at 134.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at 21–23 & 26.
Second National Communication, supra note 60, at 64.
OECD, supra note 133, at 134.
Second National Communication, supra note 60, at 67.
The New Zealand Response, supra note 24, places the figure at 34.2%. However, when the industrial processes of creating the fuel are added, this rises to approximately 40%. See the Working Group, supra note 26, at 42. For a detailed account of aggregate greenhouse emissions caused by New Zealand’s transport infrastructure, see Ministry of Transport, Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Zealand Transport (1995). This report puts the transportation contribution, when including the fuel creation process, at 45%.
Second National Communication, supra note 60, at 8; State of the Environment, supra note 101, at 31.
Indeed, 77% of the growth of this figure was attributed to increases in emissions from domestic transport. See Working Group, supra note 26, at 103.
Statistics New Zealand, The New Zealand Official Yearbook: 1996 (1996).
See Energy Efficiency & Conservation Authority, Transport Sector Energy Use: Highlights, 2 Energy Wise Monitoring Q. (1995), at 1–2.
Ministry of Transport, supra note 138, at 1. 6 State of the Environment, supra note 101, at 13. New Zealand has one car for every two people. The USA has the highest rate, with one car for every 1.7 persons. See D. Redshaw & K. Dawber, Sustainable Energy: Options For New Zealand (1997), at 87.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Zealand Transport, supra note 138, at 19.
NZPA, The Decline of Compressed Natural Gas As A Transportation Fuel, New Zealand Herald, 13 March 1996.
OECD, supra note 133, at 123; Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New Zealand Transport: supra note 138, at 18. NZ does not require vehicles to be equipped with pollution control devices or to meet emission standards. The only laws targeting air pollution from motor vehicles are the Petroleum Products Specifications Regulations 1995, issued pursuant to the Ministry of Energy Abolition Act 1989, which ban the sale of leaded petrol and Traffic Regulation Number 28, issued pursuant to the Transport Act 1962, which makes it an offence to emit smoke from a vehicle to such an extent that it obstructs the visibility of other drivers.
Ministry of Transport, Vehicle Fleet Emissions Control Strategy for Local Air Quality Management (1997), at 20–24; Ministry of Transport, Full Report: Environmental Externalities (1996) 119–123.
See State of the Environment, supra note 101, at 10–11.
Ministry of Transport, supra note 138, at 159–164.
Thus, as the Ministry for the Environment noted in 1997, “[I]t is becoming clear that behaviour change, public transport systems and strategic urban planning have as great a role to play as technical solutions.” State of the Environment, supra note 101, at 14.
OECD, supra note 133, at 123. This was reduced due to the regional petrol tax.
Personal communication, Transfund NZ, 9 June, 1998. The figures are also available in Trans-fund’s National Roading Programme Annual Reports.
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, Report to the House of Representatives: Sustainable Energy Management in New Zealand: Improvements Required in Government Policy (1992), at 4. Between 1979 and 1990, New Zealand’s energy intensity increased by 32.8%, at an annual rate of increase of 2.4%. From 1990 to 1993, energy intensity grew at a rate of 1.7% per year. Between 1993 and 1994, consumer energy intensity fell by 2.91%. This was the first reversal in energy intensity since 1979. See also Energy Efficiency & Conservation Authority, 1994/95 Annual Report (1996), at 17.
Id. at 6. For analysis that rejects the conclusion that New Zealand’s energy production is more inefficient that other OECD countries, see Energy Efficiency & Conservation Authority, 1993/94 Annual Report and 1994/95 Business Plan (1995), at 12–13.
OECD, supra note 133, at 113.
1993/94 Annual Report, supra note 154, at 20–24. Indeed, as the 1994/95 Annual Report emphasised, ‘Above all, the Authority is a facilitator.’ Id. at 2. The only dictate to facilitate energy efficiency is in the 1992 Building Regidations, Clause Hl.However, this clause says little more than that energy efficiency should be encouraged, without laying down any specifics of how this is to be done.
This is not to suggest that the EECA provides no assistance in this context. Indeed, in the period of 1994–1995, $2.9 million was advanced to public sector bodies for improved energy efficiency. However, given the vast market for energy efficiency in New Zealand, see Ministry of Commerce, Renewable Energy Opportunities in New Zealand (1993); this amount is minuscule and its scope (i.e., only certain public bodies) is far too limited. This is especially so when compared with the trends in other countries that are actively promoting alternative forms of renewable energy and increased energy efficiencies. See
C. Flavin, Harnessing the Sun and the Wind, in State of the World: 1995 (L.R. Brown ed., 1995), at 58–76.
The New Zealand Response II, supra note 60, at 9, 72.
Ministry of Commerce, supra note 157.
See Ministry of Commerce, Energy Data File: 1996 (1996).
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987), at 168–169, 196, 198, 201. A. Williamson, Technology and Market Issues, in Sustainable Energy For New Zealand: How Do We Make It Happen ? (1994), at 37, 38; G. Bertram, Economics and Finance Issues, id. at 49, 52–55;
J. Peet, et al., Climate Change and Energy: Challenge and Choice, in Clmate Change: The New Zealand Response: A Workshop, (Ministry for the Environment ed., 1988), at 157, 161. The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, supra note 153, was very direct on this point, at 8, 23–26, 41, 44. The same conclusions were recognised by the Stratford Inquiry; supra note 39, at paras. 8.63, 8.64, 8.68, 8.74–8.76, 8.81–8.83, 8.85–8.87, 8.91, 12.2 (17).
OECD, supra note 133, at 113, 116, 122, 126–130.
The legislation creating competitive gas and electricity markets “do not in themselves ensure that energy efficiency will be promoted, but, instead, set the scene for this to happen where commercially viable prospects exist.” As such, energy efficiency and the pursuit of new renewables are “secondary objectives.” The New Zealand Response II, supra note 60, at 49–50.
New Zealand Treasury, The Design of a Possible Low-Level Carbon Charge for New Zealand (1997);
B. Orsman, Carbon Tax Deferral Is Surrender, Govt Told, N.Z. Herald, 13 March 1997, Second National Communication, supra note 60, at 47.
Ministry for the Environment, Environment 2010 Strategy (1995), at Principle 4.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at viii. The earlier report of the Ministry for the Environment, (1997) placed this figure at “approximately 60%.” Second National Communication, supra note 60, at 7.
That is, the Kyoto outcome “may even create positive welfare impacts for NZ.” Late Paper, supra note 51. Annex B. Irrespective of the possible benefits, the inclusion of such approaches could reduce the costs of reducing greenhouse gases by up to 70–80%. Minister for the Environment, supra note 37, at 4. Kyoto Outcome, supra note 34. The Ministry for the Environment even went so far as to suggest that, “even if we do not achieve an outcome involving ‘sinks the way we want them’ the costs for NZ of achieving a stabilisation or a -5% target may not be intolerable” [emphasis in original], Ministry for the Environment, Climate Change Negotiations Paper: Comment, 24 November 1997, at 2. Cf. New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Potential Macroeconomic Impacts of Trade in Carbon Removal: Report to the Ministry for the Environment (1997), at 2.
See supra note 1.
See Peter Alsop’s chapter in this book.
Ministry for the Environment, supra note 103, at 6.
See R. Chapman, Successful Outcome at Kyoto, Ministry for the Environment Newsletter. 8 March 1998.
S. Upton, Reflections on the Kyoto Conference, Press Release, 29 December 1997.
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Gillespie, A. (2000). New Zealand and The Climate Change Debate: 1995–1998. In: Gillespie, A., Burns, W.C.G. (eds) Climate Change in the South Pacific: Impacts and Responses in Australia, New Zealand, and Small Island States. Advances in Global Change Research, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47981-8_10
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