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Game Theory Models in Accounting

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Game Theory and Business Applications

Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 35))

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Authors
  1. Chandra Kanodia
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Pennsylvania State University, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

  2. Boston University, USA

    William F. Samuelson

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© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Kanodia, C. (2002). Game Theory Models in Accounting. In: Chatterjee, K., Samuelson, W.F. (eds) Game Theory and Business Applications. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 35. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47568-5_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47568-5_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-0-7923-7332-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47568-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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