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Game Theory and the Market

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Chapters in Game Theory

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library C: ((TDLC,volume 31))

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Authors
  1. Eric Van Damme
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  2. Dave Furth
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Peter Borm

  2. University of Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Hans Peters

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© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Van Damme, E., Furth, D. (2002). Game Theory and the Market. In: Borm, P., Peters, H. (eds) Chapters in Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library C:, vol 31. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47526-X_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47526-X_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4020-7063-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-306-47526-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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