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Slikker, M., van Den Nouweland, A. (2002). Network Formation, Costs, and Potential Games. In: Borm, P., Peters, H. (eds) Chapters in Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library C:, vol 31. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47526-X_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47526-X_11
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