Abstract
In 1991 Ekert proposed to use Bell inequalities in the so called E91 quantum key distribution protocol. This was the first alternative to the well known BB84 protocol of Bennett and Brassard. In 1992, Bennett, Brassard and Mermin explained that the E91 protocol is no more secure than the original BB84 protocol which do not use Bell inequalities at all. So, apparently, violation of locality was not useful in quantum cryptography. In 1998 Mayers and Yao restored back violation of locality in quantum cryptography with the concept of a self-checking source, a source of Bell states which is provided together with testing devices. The test is designed such that, if passed, the source and the testing devices are guaranteed to be identical modulo some isomorphism to the original specification. We discuss the self-checking source of Mayers and Yao, how it is related to the E91 protocol and the fair sampling assumption which was first used to address the detection loophole in Bell inequalities experiments.
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© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Mayers, D., Tourenne, C. (2002). Violation of Locality and Self-Checking Source: A Brief Account. In: Tombesi, P., Hirota, O. (eds) Quantum Communication, Computing, and Measurement 3. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47114-0_43
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-47114-0_43
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