Abstract
The Cliques protocols are extensions of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to a group setting. In this paper, we are analysing the A-GDH.2 suite that is intended to allow a group to share an authenticated key and to perform dynamic changes in the group constitution (adding and deleting members, ⋯ ). We are proposing an original method to analyze these protocols and are presenting a number of unpublished flaws with respect to each of the main security properties claimed in protocol definitions (key authentication, perfect forward secrecy, resistance to known-keys attacks). Most of these flaws arise from the fact that using a group setting does not allow to reason about security properties in the same way as when only two (or three) parties are concerned.
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© 2001 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing
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Pereira, O., Quisquater, JJ. (2001). Security Analysis of the Cliques Protocols Suites: First Results. In: Dupuy, M., Paradinas, P. (eds) Trusted Information. SEC 2001. IFIP International Federation for Information Processing, vol 65. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-46998-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-46998-7_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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