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A Historical Perspective on the Relationship Between Law and Morality

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Strange Bedfellows
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Endnotes and References

  1. See, e.g., Brian Bix, “Natural Law Theory,” in Dennis Patterson, ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 1999), pp. 223–240.

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  2. In his critique of H.L.A. Hart’s positivistic viewpoint, Dworkin argues that what that viewpoint ignores is “the crucial fact that jurisprudential issues are at their core issues of moral principle, not legal fact or strategy.” Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 7.

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  3. Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 12.

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  4. Two examples of this kind of argument are offered by Roger B. Dworkin and Richard A. Posner. The former actually maintains that “there was no need for the Supreme Court to decide anything about abortion.” Roger B. Dworkin, Limits—The Role of Law in Bioethical Decision Making (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 53. The latter argues that in deciding Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court “ducked the moral issue.” Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, p. 134.

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  5. John Austin, The Providence of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1955).

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  6. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 49–64.

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  7. Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law,” Harvard Law Review (1897), 10: 61–80.

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  8. Holmes, note 7, p. 63.

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  9. Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 1, 11, 22 (Nuremberg, 1947–1949).

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  10. Trial note 9, Vol. 19, pp. 465–466.

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  11. H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law Revie Harvard Law Review (1958), 71: 593–629.

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  12. Lon Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law,” Harvard Law Review (1958), 71: 630–672.

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  13. Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959).

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  14. Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 74.

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  15. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956), p. 13.

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  16. Arthur Caplan, Keynote Address, Holocaust and Bioethics Conference, Minneapolis, MN. (1989), cited in George J. Annas, “The Dominance of American Law (and Market Values) Over American Bioethics,” in Michael Grodin, ed., Meta MedicalEthics: The Philosophical Foundations of Bioethics (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), p. 85.

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  17. Germany (Territory Under Allied Occupation, 1945–1955: U.S. Zone) Military Tribunals, 1947, “Permissible Military Experiments.” In Vol. 2 of Trials of War Criminals Before Nuremberg Tribunals Under Control Law, No. 10, pp. 181–184 Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

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  18. George J. Annas, Standard of Care: The Law of American Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 3.

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  19. Annas, note 18, at p. 86.

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  20. Annas, note 18, at p. 87.

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  21. Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1983); Emory University v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E. 2d 903 (Ga. 1981); Ash v. NewYork UniversityDental Center, 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).

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  22. Charles E. Rosenberg, “Meanings, Policies, and Medicine: On the Bioethical Enterprise and History,” Daedalus (1999), 128: 27–46, p. 37.

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  23. Shana Alexander, “They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies:Medical Miracle Puts a Burden on a Small Committee,” Life 53 (102): November 9, 1962.

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  24. .For a detailed chronology of the Finkbine case and its coverage in the media see David J. Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality (N.Y.: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1994), pp. 285–289.

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© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers

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(2002). A Historical Perspective on the Relationship Between Law and Morality. In: Strange Bedfellows. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-46849-2_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/0-306-46849-2_3

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