Selling Boundary Reform

  • Joseph DrewEmail author


For any public policy to be successful in the long-run it needs to be sold carefully. Local government boundary reform is no exception. No matter how good the plan is unless residents, leaders and staff buy into the idea the full potential of the reform is unlikely to be realised. As a number of former political leaders can attest there are considerable costs involved in selling boundary reform. However, with the right tools and planning these costs might be minimised. In this chapter I first describe the three main types of costs—opportunity, contingency, and legacy—with respect to boundary reform. I then outline the various tools that might be applied to the task of minimising these costs. Following this I spend some time on the oft-neglected after sales care which is not just important to minimising legacy costs, but is also essential to a morally licit reform. I conclude with some remarks about the chances of successfully selling boundary reform.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Technology SydneyMoonbiAustralia

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