A Comprehensive Theory of Local Government

  • Joseph DrewEmail author


This chapter sets out a comprehensive theory of local government which clarifies the purpose of the institution as well as the structures required to ensure that its remit is achieved but not over-reached. To do so, I first explore the reason for local government and the danger that it poses to its citizens as well as the various theories proposed to counter this danger. Following this, I explore additional theories of local government with emphasis on the most economic design of the institution. I then propose a comprehensive theory of local government which borrows from the best of the extant work to explain both the purpose of local government and how this purpose might be safely realised. I conclude with some remarks on how the comprehensive theory of local government is an essential foundation for any local government reform aimed at ensuring the institution is truly closest to the people and serves the people best.


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Technology SydneyMoonbiAustralia

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