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Homological Fault Attack on AES Block Cipher and Its Countermeasures

  • Ning Shang
  • Jinpeng Zhang
  • Yaoling Ding
  • Caisen Chen
  • An WangEmail author
Conference paper
  • 2 Downloads
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 1143)

Abstract

As the physical security of hardware systems becomes more and more serious, a large number of physical attacks and countermeasures against on-chip cryptographic algorithms are proposed. Clock glitch injection is an easy-to-implement and effective fault type. This paper presents a novel clock glitch-based fault attack on hardware-implemented encryption algorithm called homological fault attack (HFA). It allows us to attack with coarse-grained clock glitches and can extract the key only by the plaintext and whether the encryption result is correct. At the same time, this paper carries out HFA experiment on AES-128 encryption algorithm implemented on FPGA in the real physical environment. Experimental results show that HFA can be used for serial and parallel implementation of AES hardware implementation. And this method can be easily extended to attack other block encryption algorithms.

Keywords

Homological fault attack Clock glitch Hardware security 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61872040, U1836101), National Cryptography Development Fund (No. MMJJ20170201), Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory (No. KJ-17-009).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ning Shang
    • 1
  • Jinpeng Zhang
    • 1
  • Yaoling Ding
    • 1
  • Caisen Chen
    • 2
  • An Wang
    • 1
    • 3
    Email author
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceBeijing Institute of TechnologyBeijingChina
  2. 2.Military Exercise and Training Center, Army Academy of Armored ForcesBeijingChina
  3. 3.State Key Laboratory of Information SecurityInstitute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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