Impossible Differential Analysis on 8-Round PRINCE

  • Yaoling Ding
  • Keting JiaEmail author
  • An Wang
  • Ying Shi
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 1143)


PRINCE is a lightweight block cipher, which was proposed by Borghoff et al. in Asiacrypt 2012. Various cryptanalytic techniques have been employed to evaluate the security of PRINCE. In 2017, Ding et al. constructed a 4-round impossible differential based on some observations on M′ operation and launched impossible differential attacks on 6- and 7-round PRINCE and the underlying PRINCEcore. In this paper, we explore the differential distribution table (DDT) of the S-box employed in PRINCE and construct a more detailed DDT which contains the input/output values corresponding to each differential. Taking advantage of the table, we compute the subkeys instead of guessing them. With this technique, we extend the impossible differential attacks of PRINCE and PRINCEcore to eight rounds. The corresponding computational and complexities are \( 2^{110.7} \) and \( 2^{62.26} \) encryptions, respectively, which are much less than exhaustive search. And the data complexities are \( 2^{64} \) and \( 2^{60} \) chosen plaintexts, respectively.


PRINCE Impossible differential S-box M′ operation 



This work is supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China (No. 2017YFA0303903), National Cryptography Development Fund (Nos. MMJJ20170121, MMJJ20170201), Zhejiang Province Key R&D Project (No. 2017C01062), National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61872040, U1836101) and Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory (No. KJ-17-009).


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceBeijing Institute of TechnologyBeijingChina
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina
  3. 3.Key Laboratory of Network Assessment TechnologyCAS Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  4. 4.State Key Laboratory of Information SecurityInstitute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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