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Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion

  • Moriki HosoeEmail author
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Abstract

So far the prevalent administrative methods in Japan have been called a preventivism or ex-ante regulation system. This is an administrative method under which the regulatory authority regulates ex-ante the related business world in charge so as not to do unfair behaviours or do “over-competition”. It is contrary to ex-post regulation with rigorous penalty system for rule-breakers and the clearness of regulation rule. In this paper we investigate the comparative analysis of ex-ante regulation policy and ex-post one.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Emeritus ProfessorKyushu UniversityHigashi-ku, FukuokaJapan

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