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Introduction: Applied Economics of Information and Risk

  • Moriki HosoeEmail author
  • Iltae Kim
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  • 7 Downloads

Abstract

In the development and dynamics of modern society, information and risk are notable keywords not only in the living level but also in economic activities. The feature of this book is to examines various hot topics of applied economy from the point of the view of the economics of information and risk. Particularly, it examines how information and risk issues affect the behavior of economic entities and transactions between economic agents, based on theoretical analysis of information and risks.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Emeritus ProfessorKyushu UniversityHigashi-ku, FukuokaJapan
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsChonnam National UniversityGwangjuKorea

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