Hardware Trojan on SIMON Architecture for Key Retrieval

  • Sivappriya ManivannanEmail author
  • K. K. Soundra PandianEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 1116)


The need of an hour is the research on design and impacts of Hardware Trojan Horse in a crypto module to serve the purpose of secret key recovery. SIMON is a light weight block cipher that indulges to optimally work with hardware environment. Few papers have come up with the fault attack on SIMON cipher. In this paper, two bit toggle fault attack on 29\(^{th}\) round of the SIMON by intruding Hardware Trojan Horse is realized. The structural design of Hardware Trojan includes activation of two payloads with a single trigger. In consequence, the round key of SIMON cipher is retrieved by executing Differential Fault Analysis, using the fault free and completely faulty ciphertext. The power consumption of the SIMON design for both with and without Hardware Trojan is estimated using Simulation Activity Information File (.saif) on ZYNQ 7000 SoC family FPGA board and observed that there is minimal overhead of 1.32%. Provided, almost negligible difference of one LUT in area utilization is discerned. This infers that the insertion of designed HTH in the SIMON module have created an imperceptible impact and bypasses the testing process.


Hardware Trojan Horse Block cipher SIMON cipher Fault attack Differential Fault Analysis 



Its an immense pleasure for the authors to show their gratitude towards Interdisciplinary Cyber Physical Systems (ICPS) project, Department of Science and Technology (DST) for funding this research work under Project number: DST/ICPS/CPS-Individual/2018/819.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electronics and Communication EngineeringPDPM-Indian Institute of Information Technology, Design and ManufacturingJabalpurIndia
  2. 2.Controller of Certifying Authorities, Ministry of Electronics and Information TechnologyGovernment of IndiaNew DelhiIndia

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