Shapley Value Method for Benefit Distribution of Technology Innovation in Construction Industry with Intuitionistic Fuzzy Coalition

  • Ting HanEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 1082)


The formation of the technology innovation coalition of the construction industry can give full play to the resource advantages of all participants, innovate technologies, save cost, improve construction quality, and achieve a multi-win situation. The key to the success of the coalition is to establish a fair and efficient mechanism of benefit distribution. Firstly, the forming mechanism and value creation mechanism is analyzed. Then the benefit distribution under the condition that members have certain degree of participation and certain degree of non-participation in the coalition is discussed, assuming that the members are fully aware of the expected benefit of different cooperation strategies before the cooperation. The essence is to solve cooperative game with intuitionistic fuzzy coalition. In this paper, Shapley value for intuitionistic fuzzy cooperative game is proposed by taking use of intuitionistic fuzzy set theory, Choquet integrals and continuous ordered weighted average operator. It’s also proofed that the defined Shapley value satisfies three axioms. Finally, the effectiveness and rationality of Shapley is illustrated by a numerical example.


Intuitionistic Fuzzy coalition Technology innovation in construction industry Benefit distribution Shapley value method 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Fuzhou University of International Studies and TradeFuzhouPeople’s Republic of China

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