An Allocation Value of Cooperative Game with Communication Structure and Intuitionistic Fuzzy Coalitions
At present, the researches on the cooperative games mainly based on the hypothesis that arbitrary coalitions can be formed and the fuzzy coalitions are Aubin’s form. However, it is always not true in reality. This paper defines a cooperative game with communication structure and intuitionistic fuzzy coalition, in which the partners have some hesitation degrees and different risk preferences when they take part in limited coalitions. There are lower and upper participation degrees of players in coalitions by introducing confidence levels to intuitionistic fuzzy coalitions. Then a formula of average tree solution (short called AT solution) for this cooperative game is proposed based on the defined preference weighted form by taking account of players’ risk preferences, and the existence of the solution according to axioms system is proved. Finally, the effectiveness of this method is demonstrated by a practical example of profit allocation. This research extends the cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions, and integrates individual preferences information of players in cooperation.
KeywordsGraph cooperative games Fuzzy coalition Average tree solution Intuitionistic fuzzy number Risk preference
This research was partially supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71572040, 71601049), the Science Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (No. 19YJC630201), the Project for Ecological Civilization Research of Fujian Social Science Research Base (Nos. KXJD1813A, KXJD1837A), the Program for Distinguished Young Scholars in University of Fujian Province (No. K80SCC55A), and the Project of Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University (No. XJQ201635). We appreciate the comments and suggestions will give by the reviewers and editor of this journal.
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