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Conclusions

  • Javier Guerrero C.
Chapter

Abstract

In the concluding chapter, the author brings together common threads that had emerged throughout the book. The chapter reflects on the need to overcome the oversimplified accounts of the nature of the practices of both sides of the binary interdiction/evasion: smugglers, on the one hand, characterised by flexible, innovative, and highly adaptive organisations; inflexible law enforcement agencies (LEAs), on the other, slow to make decisions, change, and adapt. Reconsidering the production of drug smugglers’ technologies as a result of dispersed peer innovation, and Navy responses as shaped by the interplay of the arena of commando and the arena of practice as a co-evolutionary process, leads to a better understanding of such antagonist relationships.

Keywords

War on Drugs Interdiction Flexibility Co-evolution 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Javier Guerrero C.
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Arts and HumanitiesInstituto Tecnológico MetropolitanoMedellínColombia

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