Public Debt, Lobbying and Endogenous Redistribution in an Overlapping-Generations Model
The recent slowdown of global economy contributed to ignite a sovereign debt crisis that has shaken several economies, and the European Economic and Monetary Union in particular. These events have helped to revamp the interests of scholars on fiscal reconstruction. Decisions concerning the amount, speed and approach (cut in public expenditures vs. tax increase) of containment and reduction of public debt have clear distributive impacts not only within but also across generations (think, for example, of the problem of sustainability of the pension system in aging societies).
- Buti, Mario, and Paul van den Noord. (2003). Discretionary fiscal policy and elections: the experience of the early years of EMU, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, No. 351.Google Scholar
- Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84: 833–850.Google Scholar