Population Aging and Tax Policy in Korea

  • Kiseok HongEmail author


Korea has long been considered a country with relatively stable public finances compared to other major countries. However, due to the shrinking tax base after years of low economic growth and the increasing need for welfare spending, concerns are rising about the nation’s long-term fiscal sustainability. Also, the accelerating pace of population aging is expected to exacerbate fiscal pressures. Considering these structural changes and the relatively low tax burden in Korea, it seems inevitable that the tax rate will be raised by a substantial margin in the future. An important question, then, is which tax to raise. Against this backdrop, this study attempts to examine what impact population aging may have on the nation’s taxation structure and to draw implications for the direction of future tax reforms.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ewha Womans UniversitySeoulSouth Korea

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