Fertility Dynamics with Family Bargaining
Statistical discrimination might lead to shorter and less frequent labor market participation of women than would otherwise be measured. Such is apparently the case especially in Japan, as emphasized by Kawaguchi (Jenda Keizai Kakusa (Economic gender gap). Keiso-Shobo, Tokyo, 2008) and Yamaguchi (Hatarakikata no Danjo Hubyodo: Riron to Jissho-Bunseki (Gender inequality in working: Theory and empirical analysis). Nihon Keizai-Shinbun Sha, Tokyo, 2017). It is statistically plausible that women are likely to withdraw from the labor market when they marry or have children. Therefore, women tend to be given only light and easy work and thereby earn a lower wage income. When capital accumulation is low, physical labor is considerably important for goods production. Men have more physical strength than women. Therefore, the male wage rate is high. Although biological differences exist between women and men, it has been recognized that statistical gender discrimination might not be a necessary consequence of biological gender differences.
Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science KAKENHI Grant No.16H03635 is gratefully acknowledged.
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