Attacks Detection Method Based on Free Space Quantum Secure Direct Communication

  • Jinlong Liu
  • Zhutian Yang
  • Zhilu WuEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering book series (LNEE, volume 517)


Quantum secure direct communication is a new communication mode in the free space. Quantum secure direct communication utilizes single photon with the information to transmit ciphertext in the quantum channel directly, and it distinguishes from Quantum key distribution. Its outstanding characteristics are as follows: super velocity of light, high power capacity, high security, and anti-interference, so quantum secure direct communication can break the traditional secret communication frame to ensure the absolute secure communication. However, the imperfection of optical devices can leave loopholes for quantum attacks. Based on free space, this paper puts forward one kind of attack detection method in the field of quantum secure direct communication. This paper introduces quantum bit error rate analysis and decoy-state photon transmission rate analysis for designing security detection process to effectively detect the eavesdropping and improve security.


Free space Quantum secure direct communication Quantum bit error rate Decoy state 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Electronics and Information EngineeringHarbin Institute of TechnologyHarbinChina

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