Modelling Construction Accident Tort Cases
This chapter sheds light on construction accident compensation via an analysis using mathematical modelling. First, we introduce the Nash equilibrium under the negligence rule. After that, we utilise the risk compensation and thermostat theory to investigate risk-taking behaviours on the sites. Furthermore, we attempt to reveal a mathematical interpretation of accident compensation. The results of this study show that (1) the negligence rule forces workers to maintain a high level of due care and minimise total social costs and (2) risk-taking behaviour is an optimal solution to workers, in that it is unlikely that taking zero risks is the best for them. As many places around the globe adopt common law in their formal institutions which govern construction compensation, the paper illustrates its practical implications for the legal and construction industries in similar jurisdictions.
KeywordsConstruction safety Economic analysis Mathematical model Tort
This chapter is a modified version of the Li, Rita Yi Man, Chau, Kwong Wing; Poon, Sun Wah; Ho, Daniel Chi Wing; Lu, Weisheng Wilson; Fung, Darren; Zeng, Frankie; Leung, Tat Ho (2017) Construction accident tort cases: mathematical and economic modelling approach 53rd Associated Schools of Construction, hosted by University of Washington and Washington State University, Seattle. We thank for the right to republish the revised version.
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