Promoting Chinese Across Borders

  • Minglang ZhouEmail author


This chapter examines how rising China challenges the global language order by launching an initiative to promote Chinese globally through Confucius Institutes and Classrooms. To account for China’s international language planning, this chapter adopts a community second language acquisition model that conceives a surface level of institutional development and a deep level of identity construction. On the deep level, China is ideologically challenged, particularly in the West, because of its failed mediation among the real, official, and perceived Chinas in classrooms, while it faces strategic challenges from its guarded neighbors and Muslim states. On the surface level, China has won collaborations worldwide, wherever money and/or coercion works, and instigated campus politics and engaged double agents for the best interest of China’s rise and its vision of “One World.”


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Maryland College ParkCollege ParkUSA

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