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The Problem of Unity and Relational Internalism

  • Bo R. MeinertsenEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 136)

Abstract

States of affairs are instantiations of universals by particulars. We have examined these particulars and universals. The task we now face is to account for how states of affairs are unified, to account for the unity of states of affairs. That is, we face the problem of unity.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyTongji UniversityShanghaiChina

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