Local Cadres

  • Thomas HebererEmail author


This chapter examines the function, role, and administration of local cadres. Here, the term “local cadres” refers particularly to officials at the county (city), township, and village levels. The chapter is structured as follows: first, China’s cadre system, in general, is briefly explained. Second, the discretionary power of county governments is examined. We then consider the role of three levels of officials: county, town and township, and village cadres. In addition, we introduce the analytical concept of “strategic groups” (SGs) to illustrate how to capture local cadres and their behavior from a theoretical perspective. Finally, we deal with the evaluation of cadres’ performance by superior bodies and the role of policy piloting at the local level.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Political Science and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of Duisburg-EssenDuisburgGermany

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