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Toward an Appropriate Structure of Right

  • Mohammad Dulal Miah
  • Yasushi Suzuki
Chapter

Abstract

It is obvious that the developing countries should set the institution of property rights right. However, the question is how to achieve this milestone. The new liberal prescriptions require an intervention-free distribution of resources. However, considering the level of economic development and state capacity of developing countries, it might be infeasible to comply with the new liberal prescriptions. Thus, we draw lessons from the development experience of ‘developmental state’, where distribution does not require a market free from intervention but an interventionist state that yields positive economic outcomes. We draw lessons from the early development experience of Japan and Korea to offer some policy prescriptions toward better institutional design. In doing so, we keep in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all development mantra that can be replicated overnight. However, East Asian development miracle offers many lessons for developing economies. We formulate policy prescription keeping both pros and cons of developmental state in mind.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mohammad Dulal Miah
    • 1
  • Yasushi Suzuki
    • 2
  1. 1.University of NizwaBirkat Al MawzOman
  2. 2.Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific UniversityBeppuJapan

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